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ABSTRACT: 
 
The Panchayati Raj System was aimed to be a tool for democratisation and 
development of the rural parts of India. The state of West Bengal was long time 
considered a model for a efficient and exemplary implementation of local self-
government. Especially the early successes of the Communist government in land 
reforms and social justice during the late 1970s and the 1980s sparked academic 
interest in this model. 
This paper intends to examine this view on the base of a survey amongst the rural 
populace in the West Bengal district of Burdwan about the perception of the 
Panchayat institutions itself and their perceived performance. The aim is to prove 
or disprove West Bengals perceived model character by investigating the view of 
the ordinary citizen on the Panchayats and the impression he/she has about the 
institutions performance in various fields, e.g. infrastructure. The paper also 
looks into the roles of both leading political parties, the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist) (CPI-M) and the All India Trinamool Congress (AITC), in the West 
Bengal Panchayats and how these roles are perceived.  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Panchayati Raj
3
 is a system of local self-government in India which aims to 
empower the citizens at the grass-roots by giving them control over a great portion 
                                                 
1
 This paper is based on a survey conducted in August and September 2008 originally as a 
basis for my Magister Thesis. 
2
 I would like to thank Professor Subrata K. Mitra for the support in the preparations for 
this survey and during the time of writing the thesis. I also would like to thank Professor 
Harihar Bhattacharyya for the support during the survey itself and the time after it. Further 
I am grateful to the Department of Political Science, South Asia Institute, Heidelberg 
University and the team of the HPSACP. Last I would like to thank the reviewer of this 
paper. The Author can be contacted at kai.fabian@gmx.net. 
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of their political and economic affairs. Its implementation is aimed at introducing, 
supporting and stabilizing development and democratisation. A first attempt at a 
constitutional provision for Panchayati Raj was Article 40 of the Indian 
Constitution. But this article gave no clear instructions to the states who had to 
ratify the Panchayats into state laws under the federal constitution. The big leap for 
the Panchayati Raj System (PRS) came in the form of the 73
rd
 Amendment to the 
Indian Constitution in 1992, which made the PRS compulsory for the states and 
gave clear introductions on the rights and privileges of the Panchayati Raj 
Institutions (PRI), which were now to be organised into three tiers.  
 
West Bengal had begun the establishment of its PRS much earlier, in 1978, 
after the Left-Front (LF), led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M), 
had come into power in 1977. The CPI-M had made a strong PRS part of its 
political manifesto, which focused mostly on rural development. The much 
acclaimed Operation Barga, which was conducted through the Panchayati Raj 
Institutions (PRI) in 1978, showed the success of such a decentralisation of power. 
The strong state support towards the PRI by the CPI-M-led government and the 
success of this system in developing the rural areas during the early years of the 
West Bengal PRS made it a model both for academic research as well as for the 
73
rd
 Amendment. But in recent years, cracks in the left‟s bastion of support in the 
rural areas have been found evident in the loss of considerable grounds in the last 
Panchayats polls in 2008 followed by the Lok Sabha (general) elections in 2009. 
While the government‟s fiasco in mishandling both the Nadigram events in 2007 
and the Singur Tata small car (Nano) factory issue in 2008-09 will have produced 
impact on the outcome of the left performance, there is need for going beyond and 
look into the long term factors for explaining the apparent decline of the left 
Panchayats in West Bengal considered to be a model for the rest of India and 
acclaimed world over.  
 
The aim of this paper is to take a look at the present situation by examining 
the perception of the citizens with the help of a case study in the district of 
Burdwan in order to assess and analyse the present situation with the help of a 
survey which examines the perception of the PRS by the citizens of the district of 
Burdwan. The question underlying my survey is the following: How is the actual 
situation perceived by the citizens and what can be inferred about the West Bengal 
PRS when the citizens‟ perception is taken into account? Furthermore, can the 
claim that the West Bengal version of the PRS as a model in decline be verified 
based on the findings of the case study?  
 
I will try to answer the above questions by evaluating the data of a survey I 
conducted in the district in question during August and September 2008. This 
structured quantitative study contains, amongst other things, data concerning the 
perception of PRI services and the trust in the PRI. The design of the study thus 
enables me not just to gain an estimate of the situation in situ but also to gain 
insight into possible approaches to the problem from below.  Additionally, I will 
also use the findings of the empirical study to test two theoretical approaches 
within Neo-Institutionalism: the Rational Choice approach and an approach based 
on Sociological Institutionalism. 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
3 Panchayati Raj derives from the Hindi words panch meaning “five” and yat meaning 
“assembly”, raj means rule, thus Panchayati Raj literally means “the rule of the assembly 
of five”.  
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STATE OF RESEARCH 
 
A lot of research has been done on the PRS in the last decades. Most of these 
studies center on topics ranging from legal and institutional aspects (Datta 2006, 
Jain 2005, Mitra S. 1995, Goel and Rajneesh 2003), decentralisation and 
democratisation, and party control (Bhattacharyya 1998 &2002; Jain 2005, Sen 
Gupta 2006) to social inclusion and exclusion (Baviskar and Mathew 2009, Gosh 
1999). Additionally, various studies have focused on the PRI in West Bengal ( 
Kohli 1987, Thörlind 2000, Westergaard 1986), but few studies are/are based on 
quantitative surveys. With regard to the problems of CPI-M governance, 
Bhattacharyya (1998) conducted a qualitative interview series and Mitra (in: Kohli 
2001) made/carried out a quantitative survey concerning trust. Other quantitative 
studies about the PRI were made in regard to other states and  different topics. Hust 
(2002) conducted a survey about women empowerment in Orissa and Widmalm 
(2008) did a large scale survey about education, healthcare and perception in 
Madhya Pradesh and Kerala. While these studies differ in topic and approach from 
this/my study,  the methodology used for the surveys served as an inspiration for 
my own research. The problem/limitation of most of the research up to this date is 
that it is predominantly concentrated on the legal implications of the PRI or on 
programmatic approaches and operations by the CPI-M. With the exception of the 
above mentioned study by Mitra, which focuses on trust and is part of a much 
broader all-India survey, very few research engages the citizens‟ perspective 
systematically. However, a very interesting article on the topic of acceptance of 
institutions, written by Chatterjee (2009), was recently published. Because this 
article is related to my research I will give a short summary of it. Chatterjee 
focuses on stability and party clientelism in the West Bengal institutions. His 
research is based on a large quantitative sample survey and a small qualitative 
sample.
4
 In the wake of the current crisis of the left in West Bengal, Chatterjee has 
tried to use the survey results to answer an alternative question as well, that is, he 
tried to assess the role of internal problems to institutions which might endanger 
the LF-rule. I will engage more extensively with Chatterjee‟s study later on in the 
conclusion of this paper and will compare the results of my survey with those of 
his. 
The importance of the scope of support for the institutions and parties should 
not be underestimated, especially considering the cracks in communist hegemony 
due to recent events.
5
  Even though the data gathered during my survey in 2008 are 
restricted to one district and 501 respondents, they are able to provide some insight 
into the situation “on the ground” concerning the trust in the PRI, the CPI-M and 
the perception of performance in both cases. 
 
 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
 
The institutions of the Panchayati Raj System (PRS) are the heart and soul of the 
approach for empowerment, democratisation and development in India. The 
institutions are the interface between the people and the system and therefore in the 
front line of perception. The citizens, whenever they have to interact with the PRS, 
will first notice the institution of the Gram Panchayat Office or, more particularly, 
                                                 
4 No details about the quantitative sample or the questionnaire are given; the qualitative 
survey was conducted with ethnographic methods and is thus of lesser accuracy. 
5 The violent clashes in Nandigram and Singur in 2007/2008 respectively and the landslide 
losses of the CPI-M in the Panchayat elections 2008 as well as the heavy losses in the Lok 
Sabha elections 2009. 
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the people working there. In their daily life they experience the effects of the PRS 
depending on the efficiency and ability of  their local institutions to interact with 
them, react to their demands and  provide services needed. Thus, in order to gain 
an understanding of institutions and their interaction with their environment it is 
necessary to take a closer look at theory. One of the most complex theories 
concerning this topic is Neo-Institutionalism. This approach, or, more specifically, 
conglomerate of approaches, concerns itself with the foundation of institutions, 
their prevalence and their interaction with society (e.g. Powell/ DiMaggio 1991, 
Scott 2008). 
 
The very word institution loses its commonly acknowledged meaning as a 
bureaucratic organisation of the Weberian kind and is associated with a wide range 
of meanings, from a series of cognitive framing to the bureaucratic notion. This 
idea of an institution as something cognitive, that is, the influence of the perception 
of the actor, often emphasised by Zucker (1991), is an important aspect in the 
analyses of bureaucratic institutions. In his attempt to divide institutions into three 
dimensions, a regulative, a normative and a cognitive dimension, Scott (2000) has 
offered a first attempt at an analysis of institutions..Senge (2006), however, argued 
that the first two dimensions can only be perceived through the last, the cognitive 
dimension. This is important because it brings in the context of the institution. This 
context becomes more important with regard to the question of the legitimacy of an 
institution. Suchman (1995) introduced the idea that institutions, or their actors, 
can use different ways to  legitimise themselves. They can either do this by rational 
means, generating legitimacy through efficiency, or by purely cognitive means, 
generating legitimacy by relating to established cultural codes, traditions, etc.  
 
Based on these two different ideas of generating legitimacy, two different 
theoretical approaches emerged within Neo-Institutionalism. The Rational Choice 
approach,postulates that institutions are set up and legitimised by means of 
efficiency and rational considerations. Shepsle (2005) drew on game theory and 
argued that the actors can act freely within a defined political space, but only by 
means of rational choice. The institutions and rules are set up before the „game‟ 
starts and produce the boundaries of the political space. This produces, 
nevertheless, the problem of a tabula rasa before the „game‟. Therefore, another 
approach, also presented by Shepsle (2005), regards the institutions and rules as 
constantly adapting and changing. The „game‟ is thus a sequence of mutual 
influences and rational agreements by the actors on the institutions in question. 
Efficiency and legitimacy within this approach are based on the idea of pure utility. 
The actors agree on institutions when it is guaranteed that every actor involved gets 
out maximum utility and a minimum or, at best, no loss during the „game‟. A 
definition of a true Rational Choice actor is given by Jones: 
 
 “Fixed, transitive preferences for alternatives [...], an ability to calculate 
 costs in terms of forgone opportunities, an ability to compare future and 
 present benefits [...], a comprehensive utility function that integrates all 
 aspects of the decision makers life”(Jones 2001) 
 
The second approach is that of Sociological Institutionalism. In contrast to the 
Rational Choice approach, here, the emphasis lies on the context of the institutions 
and their rooting in society, that is, their grade of institutionalisation. Dobbins 
(1994) argues that the cultural context of the actor and the institution affects their 
interaction and the way an institution is legitimised. Pure efficiency based on 
rational choices is not sufficient to explain the success or failure of an institution. 
The way the actors perceive institutions through their cognitive lens and the 
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cultural traditions they are used to determine the way they act and the grade to 
which they legitimise an institution. The adherence to the rules and the 
unquestioned re-enforcement of them was analysed by March and Olsen in their 
paper on the “logic of appropriateness”. They argue that actors act according to the 
rules, when these actors are embedded in a strong social collectivity, because to act 
according to them seems natural and necessary, appropriate to act in such a manner 
(March/Olsen 2009) 
This paper intends to test both strands on the case. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The survey used in this article was conducted in the Burdwan District of West 
Bengal. This district was chosen because Burdwan is a relatively typical West 
Bengal district, encompassing agricultural villages, forestall areas, industrial sites 
and a few big cities./I chose Burdwan because it is a relatively typical West Bengal 
District, compromised of agricultural villages, forestall areas, industrial sites and a 
few big cities. This enables me to infer from the sample case of Burdwan some 
general conclusions about the state of West Bengal as a whole. Furthermore there 
are some blocks within the district where the Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
is not in power but which are ruled by the All India Trinamool Congress (AITC), 
the biggest opposition party in West Bengal. This makes it possible to compare the 
two main parties, CPI-M and AITC, in terms of perception and performance. 
 
The survey itself was conducted during August/September 2008 in seven 
different Panchayat Samiti (blocks) and ten Gram Panchayats (GP) (village level) 
within the district. These areas were chosen randomly but with the condition that 
the composition had to roughly represent the political situation in the Burdwan 
District. 
 
Although the aim was to have a random sample, it is more a stratified sample 
in which the method of random choice applies as the modus operandi: all 
interviewees had to be 18 years old by the time of the interview, so they had 
suffrage. About half of all interviewees had to be women and after ten to twelve 
interviews another area of the village had to be visited to ensure the representation 
of all social groups in the survey.  Overall the sample consisted of 501 
interviewees, of whom 58.9% were male respondents and 41.1% were female 
respondents. The questionnaire for this survey consisted of 79 questions, 
subclassified into  the following topics: General Questions, Social Environment, 
Employment, Health, Public Sphere, Trust, Political Parties, Future Perspective 
and Special Questions (including questions for women and Scheduled 
Castes/Scheduled Tribes). However, only four parts (Trust, Rating, Political 
Parties and Perceived Performance) will be relevant for this article. These are the 
parts which asked about the trust in the PRI, the ratings of them, the access to 
information provided by the PRI, the relationship to and perception of political 
parties and the perceived performance of the PRI. But prior to the assessment of 
the survey, an overview of the socio-economic background of the interviewees will 
be given. The evaluation will be made according to the above mentioned order. All 
parts will include a party-wise evaluation to see if the results are to be taken 
generally or if there is a distinction between GPs under CPI-M rule and those under 
AITC rule. 
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THE SITUATION IN WEST BENGAL DURING THE SURVEY 
 
The political scene in West Bengal today is dominated by the tensions between the 
CPI-M led Left Front (LF), which has been in government for three decades now, 
and the AITC and its allies, which has become the most important opposition party 
in recent years. The LF government proposed a strong and fast industrialisation of 
the state via SEZs, for example  in Nandigram and Singur, where they tried to 
acquire land from local farmers, partly through evictions and partly through 
compensation, which were said to be below market prices. The AITC, in contrast, 
presented itself as the defender of the land owners‟ rights and fought and still fights 
against the land acquisitions by the government.
6
 
 
These contrary positions led not only to the well known violent clashes 
between CPI-M supporters and AITC supporters in Nandigram, Singur and 
elsewhere,
7
 and to the blockade of the Tata plant in Singur, but also established the 
AITC as a protest party and attractive/viable alternative to the ruling CPI-M.
8
 The 
tensions between the CPI-M and the AITC on the one hand and the failed policies 
of the LF government in regard to the land acquisitions
9
 on the other hand caused a 
decline of the power of the CPI-M, which is evident in the results of the 2008 
Panchayat polls.
10
 The AITC was able to win over two ZP, Purba-Mindnapore, 
where Nandigram is located, 24-South Parganas,
11
 and six of fourteen PS in the 
important district of Howrah as well as four PS in the Burdwan District.
12
 Although 
the CPI-M and its LF allies were able to seize almost all ZPs and most PS, they 
experienced a serious backlash at the very core of the target group of voters, the 
rural base. Only about half of the GPs were won by the CPI-M and its LF allies, 
whereas the other half of the GPs were taken by the AITC and other minor 
opposition parties. This stands in stark contrast to the 2003 elections when the CPI-
M had been able to secure almost all GP seats,
13
 This is a development that has 
shaken the LF government to its foundations and has changed the whole political 
situation in West Bengal, especially in the rural parts of the state where the CPI-M 
and its allies are now facing an enormous opposition.  
 
Another considerable backlash for the CPI-M was the landslide victory of the 
AITC in the Lok Sabha elections held in 2009. The CPI-M, compared to the 2004 
elections, lost 17 constituencies, whereas the AITC was able to win 19 
constituencies, which are 18 more than in the 2004 elections.
1415
 
                                                 
6 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2130803.cms, http://timesofindia. 
indiatimes.com/India/Trinamool_gives_7day_ultimatum_threatens_fresh_stir/articleshow/3
512094.cms, sighted on 26 November 2008 
7http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2546872.cms,http://timesofindia. 
indiatimes.com/India/Trinamool_Congress_agitation_shuts_down_West_Bengal/articlesho
w/2504593.cms, sighted on 26 November 2008 
8 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/WB_rural_polls_Trinamool_wins_Nandigram_ 
Singur/articleshow/3059767.cms, sighted on 26 November 2008 
9 http://www1.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/498509.cms, sighted on 26 
November 2008 
10 http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Trinamool-sweeps-WB-panchayat-pollsCPM-
stunned/312674/, sighted on 26 November 2008 
11 http://wbsec.gov.in/FinalResult/FinalResult_zp.aspx, sighted on 26 November 2008 
12 http://wbsec.gov.in/FinalResult/FinalResult_ps.aspx, sighted on 26 November 2008 
13 http://indiapost.com/article/india/2871/, sighted on 26 November 2008 
14 http://info.electionsamachar.com/2009/03/loksabha-election-result-2004-west-bengal/, 
sighted 17 July 2009 
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These results show one thing very clearly: the CPI-M-led LF is on the brink of 
losing power after they have already lost their former absolute hegemony in the 
West Bengal Panchayats. Additionally, the recent Lok Sabha results should also be 
regarded as an expression of the anger many voters harbour due to the local 
problems in West Bengal and are a clear indicator for the problems of the CPI-M 
as the „party of the people‟. 
 
 
BURDWAN – STATISTICS AND POLITICAL SITUATION  
 
To put the data collected during the survey into context, the following part includes 
some statistical information about the district in general as well as some 
information about the political situation there in August and September 2008. 
 
The district of Burdwan (Bengali: Bardhaman) lies in the south of West 
Bengal, and the north-west of Kolkata, with its district headquarters in Burdwan 
City, approx. 120 km away from Kolkata. It has a population of about 6.8 million 
inhabitants, of whom 3.5 million are male and 3.3 million are female. About 4.3 
million inhabitants are living in rural areas and about 2.5 million live in urban 
areas. About 1.8 million people belong to the SC group and about 441,000 are ST. 
The district consists of 31 PS, 277 GPs and 3857 GSd.
16
   
 
Burdwan is a predominantly agrarian district, but has also two big industrial 
sites in the sub-divisions of Asansol and Durgapur.
17
 Of the working population 
42% is employed in the industrial sector, whereas 58% is employed in the agrarian 
sector. The main crop is rice, but also, potatoes, oil seeds and jute are cultivated in 
Burdwan. Only 35,5% of the population is registered as workers, but this number is 
misleading as a lot of workers in family businesses, farms and a lot of day-
labourers are not included in such a statistics. About 2.7 million people in the 
district are illiterate, most of them in the rural areas. The overall literacy rate ies at 
70.2%. The ZP of Burdwan is dominated by the CPI-M, which controls 52 of the 
67 seats. Also, 27 of the 31 PS are controlled by the CPI-M, which leaves 4 PS 
under AITC control. The CPI-M and its mass-organisations are omnipresent in the 
district, especially visible through slogans and propaganda on nearly every wall in 
Burdwan. But the decline of the party in the wake of the loss of control over nearly 
half of all GPs in West Bengal is also recognisable in Burdwan. The CPI-M and its 
allies became nervous over the growing influence of the TMC.  In some areas even 
the normally marginal BJP was able to take over control of a GP.
18
 This led to a 
phenomenon which I witnessed during my field research in Burdwan and which 
shows the tense situation. On the 20
th
 of August 2008 the CPI-M in Burdwan City 
and in most parts of the districts called a bandh, a form of strike. This strike had 
the effect that the whole life in Burdwan city came to a halt. On the usually 
crowded streets were no lorries, busses or cars, just motor-cycles and bicycles. All 
shops and restaurants were closed with the exception of pharmacies and shops with 
essential goods. Even the rickshaw drivers did not work. At some points in the city 
supporters of the CPI-M and the LF had gathered to blockade the street and to 
show support for the strike. At the centre of the city a party rally was held by the 
CPI-M, where a few hundred supporters demonstrated. The one pressing question 
arising out of this is: Why does the ruling party shut down the whole city and 
                                                                                                                            
15 http://www.indiaelections.co.in/lok-sabha-constituencies/west-bengal/, sighted 17 July 
2009 
16  http://bardhaman.gov.in/adminunit.html, sighted 28 November 2008 
17 http://bardhaman.gov.in/indus/industry.htm, sighted 28 November 2008 
18 http://wbsec.gov.in/FinalResult/FinalResult_gp.aspx, sighted 28 November 2008 
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eventually the whole state? The answer seems pretty straight forward: apparently, 
to show their strength. Although in decline, the CPI-M and the LF want to 
demonstrate that they still have enough power to shut down public life whenever 
they want. This can also be interpreted as a threat directed at the electorate, not to 
vote against the CPI-M or as a reminder that they are still the only alternative, for 
better or worse. Another phenomenon was the growing visibility of the AITC. Not 
only did the propaganda slogans on houses and walls, even in CPI-M dominated 
areas, increase, but AITC supporters also increasingly held rallies and 
demonstrations in such areas. On the 23
th
 of August 2008 I became witness to a 
demonstration of a few hundred AITC supporters in the Galsi I block, near Mankor 
GP, which is strongly dominated by the CPI-M.
19
. The demonstration moved down 
the main road, blocking it for hours, without interference by CPI-M cadres. 
Although it is very probable that most of the supporters came from other areas, it is 
still a demonstration of power by the AITC. The declining political power of the 
CPI-M and the LF and the rising influence and support of the AITC and other 
opposition parties, i.e. the BJP, produce a very tense situation in Burdwan. In some 
situations, this has led to violent clashes between the supporters of the two parties: 
for example, an AITC supporter was beaten to death by two CPI-M cadres.
20
 After 
the Panchayat polls there were also several violent clashes between CPI-M 
supporters and supporters of the AITC and INC in Burdwan.
21 
All these 
developments show the urgent need of further research on PRS and citizens‟ 
perception in the West Bengal region. 
 
 
THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
In the following section, the data which I collected for the survey in 2008 will be 
evaluated. As already mentioned, I will focus on four parts of the questionnaire. 
However, first, it is necessary to take a short look at the social composition of the 
sample. 
 
 
Social Structure 
 
In order to gain an idea about the composition of the sample I will first introduce 
the social positions of the interviewees regarding the religious and social group 
they belong to.  
 
The vast majority of respondents were Hindus, who made up 89.6% of the 
sample. Further, only 8.8% Muslims were included. This is about 11% less than the 
the statistical average of about 20% for the district, a discrepancy which can be 
explained due to the lack of female Muslim respondents, who were very reluctant 
to be interviewed. The other religious communities, like Buddhists or tribal 
religions, are marginal with overall only 1.6%. The social group is defined 
according to the varna of the interviewee, which can be roughly translated as 
„caste‟. Groups who are not part of the classical varna system, like regional jatis or 
Muslims, or who belong to the group of „Other Backward Castes‟ (OBC) are 
included in the group „other‟. In this sample 12.4% of the respondents were 
Brahmins, 25.6% belonged to the Kshatriya group, 4.4% were Vashyas and 31.2% 
                                                 
19 http://wbsec.gov.in/FinalResult/FinalResult_gp.aspx,  sighted 28 November 2008 
20 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-3395109,prtpage-1.cms,  sighted 28 
November 2008 
21 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/609243.cms, sighted 28 November 2008 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/690356.cms, sighted 28 November 2008 
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are lumped together in the group „other‟. Of the sample 23.2% belong to the group 
Scheduled Castes (SC) and 3.2% to the group Scheduled Tribes (ST). Since SC and 
ST often belong to the most marginalised groups and make up a big proportion 
amongst the rural poor, it is important to take a closer look at their perception later 
on. Another important information concerning the composition of the sample 
relates to the question of origin. The answers to the question shows that the 
majority still lives in the village where they were born (59.4%). From this can be 
inferred that the rate of migration among the population of Burdwan is moderate. 
The majority migrated within the district (28.4%), a minority came from other 
districts within West Bengal (9.4%) or from another state in India (2.2%). Only a 
very small group of merely 0,6% immigrated from Bangladesh.  
 
 
Trust 
 
The most important factor for effective governance is trust. A government, even on 
the local level, which does not have the trust of its citizens,cannot govern 
effectively. The trust in an institution is also an indicator of its legitimacy and its 
acceptance by the citizens. Thus, a governmental institution which does not have 
the trust of the majority of the citizens will also have also a low degree of 
legitimacy and therefore difficulties in enforcing decisions through persuasion. 
Such a governmental institution has to implement decisions by force or cannot 
implement them at all. In relation to this study this means that the PRI(s) have to be 
trustworthy or they will not be able to work efficiently towards development and 
democratisation. The numbers given here are the general levels of trust in the 
district of Burdwan for the whole sample. The data are evaluated concerning trust 
in the institutions of the Gram Panchayat (GP), the Panchayati Samiti (PS) and the 
state government of West Bengal as a reference. Further, the trust into GP will be 
compared between CPI-M ruled areas and AITC ruled areas. Although it is hard to 
measure a feeling like trust, it was measured in this survey in the following way: 
the interviewees had the choice between three different expressions which are: “a 
great deal” for almost complete trust in the institution in question, “somewhat” for 
basic trust in the institutions but with a critical distance and “not at all” for distrust 
in the institutions.  
 
 
Table 1: Trust in GP 
Trust in Local Gram Panchayat 
     
  
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative Percent 
Valid a great deal 89 17,8 17,8 17,8 
 somewhat 285 56,9 57,0 74,8 
 not at all 110 22,0 22,0 96,8 
 no reply 12 2,4 2,4 99,2 
 Don’t know 4 0,8 0,8 100,0 
 Total 500 99,8 100,0 
 
 
As the table shows the general trust level in the GP, the lowest of the PRI and 
therefore the least distant to the citizens, has a high rate of basic trust. Even though 
not a fifth of the interviewees have a great deal of trust in their local village 
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government, the addition of 57% who have basic trust in it makes for a healthy 
three quarter majority (74.8%!) which supports at least the existence of the 
institution. Still, the number of respondents who do not trust the GP at all lies at 
22% and outnumbers the number of strong supporters by more than 4%. On the 
brighter side, this result is clearly a statement of the citizens‟ general trust in the 
institution of GP, even more if this number is compared to the average level of 
trust in local government institutions in European states like Germany, where 
general trust lies at 65%, or France with 62% of general trust.
22
 The high rate of 
trust will become more interesting when we regard the evaluation of the perceived 
performances of PRI, especially in connection with the theoretical backdrop. To 
determine a party-wise trust rate there will be a separate evaluation of those GPs 
under CPI-M rule and those under AITC rule. 
A look at these results reveals something interesting: In GPs where the AITC rules 
the trust rate is much higher than in CPI-M ruled GPs. The average for the three 
AITC GPs in this survey is 93.9% general trust of which 42.6% have a great deal 
of trust. In the CPI-M ruled GPs the numbers are much lower. Here 69.9% have 
general and just 7.7% have a great deal of trust. Although there are still more than 
two third of the respondents in the respective GPs who have general trust in their 
institutions, these numbers can by no means compete with those from the AITC 
GPs. It should be kept in mind that  all GPs regardless of party rule had similar 
social structures and average incomes.  
When taking a look at the result for the PS, which is situated on the block level, a 
well known phenomenon as regards trust is visible. 
 
 
Table 2: Trust in PS 
Trust in Local Panchayat Samiti 
     
  
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative Percent 
Valid a great deal 67 13,4 13,4 13,4 
 somewhat 226 45,1 45,2 58,6 
 not at all 136 27,1 27,2 85,8 
 no reply 35 7,0 7,0 92,8 
 dont know 36 7,2 7,2 100,0 
 Total 500 99,8 100,0 
 
 
The number of respondents who have a great deal of trust is much lower compared 
to those of the GP. The same is valid for the interviewees who trust the institution 
somewhat. Here the result is most remarkable showing a 12% difference between 
GP and PS in respondents having basic trust. Even more interesting is the small 
increase of 5% in respondents who have no trust at all. The number which has 
increased the most is the group of respondents who have no idea about the PS or 
who do not want to answer the question. This number increased by 11% cumulated 
(4.6% for “no reply” and 6.4% for “don‟t know”). While this phenomenon is 
interesting, it is not surprising: The more distant an institution is, the less it seems 
                                                 
22 Spezial Eurobarometer 307 
Kai Fürstenberg 
 
H E I D E L B E R G  P A P E R S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A N  A N D  C O M P A R A T I V E  P O L I T I C S  
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /  
W o r k i n g  P a p e r  N o .  5 2 ,  F e b r u a r y  2 0 0 9                                                 11 
to be related to everyday life of the citizens. If the citizens are not well informed 
about the work of that institution, they cannot give an informed response to the 
question of trust. This is reflected in the 11% of respondents who could not or 
would not answer the question. It is also possible that this distance is reflected in 
the lower levels of general trust in the institution. Unfortunately though, it cannot 
be said what percentage of those respondents who had lower levels of trust or no 
trust in the PS had so out of lack of information or due to the distance of the 
institution. Information is decisive in this context, but this will be evaluated later 
on. In order to have a reference for the average level of trust, we will now take a 
closer look at the results for the state government of West Bengal. 
 
 
Table 3: Trust in the State Government 
Trust in State Government 
     
  
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative Percent 
Valid a great deal 39 7,8 7,8 7,8 
 somewhat 220 43,9 43,9 51,7 
 not at all 163 32,5 32,5 84,2 
 no reply 51 10,2 10,2 94,4 
 dont know 28 5,6 5,6 100,0 
 Total 501 100,0 100,0 
 
 
 
It is particularly noticeable that the state government commands a level of general 
trust by only a slight majority of the respondents. Moreover, only 7.8% have a 
great deal of trust in this institution. This is 10% less than the level of the GP and, 
furthermore, the level of a great deal of trust diminished by 28.8% if compared to a 
survey published by Mitra in 2001. Additionally, one third of all interviewees do 
not have any trust at all in their state government and nearly 16% could not or 
would not answer this question. There are probably various reasons for this 
outcome. On the one hand the state government is a very distant institution and 
seems to have little impact on the daily life of the average citizen in a village. This 
could explain that almost 16% of respondents did not answer the question. On the 
other hand, the state government had made some questionable policy decisions at 
the time of the survey, which had a major impact on citizens‟ daily life.23 These 
decisions, which mainly pertained to land acquisition for economical purposes, 
might have led the perception of the   the state government as oppressive and not 
trustworthy. Especially the land acquisition policies for the so-called Special 
Economic Zones (SEZ) at Nandigram and Singur provoked a strong opposition 
movement which was led by the AITC. The mobilisation of political opposition 
was also carried out in the district of Burdwan, although this district was not 
directly affected by the policies. Therefore, it can be assumed that political 
mobilisation by both parties, especially during rallies and blockades, and strong 
media attention to the problem, led to an increase in information available to the 
citizens, and thus might have influenced the feeling of trust in the state government 
- obviously, in a negative way. It is important to note the difference in the 
                                                 
23 See pp. 6 
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allocation of trust at the different levels. Whereas at the GP level the respondents 
have an “agreement without cheer”, that is, basic trust in the institution at large, the 
institutions at the state level, often led by the CPI-M, are much more distrusted. 
In principle, it is possible to generalise from this section that the “agreement 
without cheer” is highest at the local level, diminishing gradually further up on the 
institutional structure. This could be due to two reasons: first of all, the party 
cadres of the CPI-M, as well as of any other party, like the AITC, are strongest at 
the lowest level, deeply embedded in the daily life of a village. The cadres 
themselves are often important people from the area having strong connections to 
the GPs elite. In this environment it is therefore relatively easy to uphold the 
appearance of indispensability and to make the citizens believe that they have no 
alternative then to vote for, support and trust the ruling party. This effect is 
especially visible in the areas ruled by the CPI-M. Secondly,  the farther you 
upwards the more attention the media pays to party scandals, inter-party clashes 
and general politics. In the case of the land acquisitions the media reported widely 
on the topic. It is very likely that this affected the level of trust engendered by the 
CPI-M led state government. At the same time, this did not necessarily affect the 
trust in the local CPI-M government in Burdwan, as it is not directly affected by 
these land acquisitions.  
 
 
Rating of the Work 
 
While trust measures the support an institution gets from the citizens, the rating of 
its work measures the subjective impression the citizens have of the overall 
capability of the institution to deliver. Here, the performance of the GP and PS
24
, as 
perceived by the citizens, will be evaluated. 
 
Table 4: Rating of the Job of the GP: 
Rating of the Job done by the Gram Panchayat 
     
  
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative Percent 
Valid excellent 24 4,8 4,8 4,8 
 good 135 26,9 26,9 31,7 
 ok 235 46,9 46,9 78,6 
 not good 60 12,0 12,0 90,6 
 bad 40 8,0 8,0 98,6 
 no reply 4 0,8 0,8 99,4 
 dont know 3 0,6 0,6 100,0 
 Total 501 100,0 100,0 
 
 
 
This table shows that approx. 80% are content with the performance of their GP (if 
we define that „ok‟ is an approving expression). This is in accordance with the 
number of respondents with basic or a great deal of trust in their GP. This answer 
was to be expected since the question asks only for an overall assessment of the 
                                                 
24 There were no data collected on the rating of the state government 
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performance of the local GP and is not directed at a specific program or project. In 
the perception of the interviewees the support via trust for their institution and a 
general rating of its performance are closely connected because it seems unlikely to 
support and trust an institution and then assess incompetence of this institution. It 
is more likely that a larger amount of people rate the working of the GP better than 
their level of support (trust) might suggest because they might have the impression 
of a good working institution and nevertheless distrust the party in power. This 
assumption can be validated if we compare the numbers, although only by a small 
margin (approx. 4%). Like in the trust ratings the rating of the work done by the 
GP in AITC areas are also much better than those of the CPI-M. 90.1% (75.1% in 
CPI-M GPs) rate the job carried out by their GP as „ok‟, 59.2% (20.1% in CPI-M 
GPs) said the GP does a good job and 9.2%, compared to just 2.9% in CPI-M GPs, 
rate the job as excellent. 
 
The afore mentioned link between performance and trust levels must also become 
visible in the ratings of the PS through a proportional decrease in positive 
assessment of the job carried out by this institution. 
 
Table 5: Rating of the Job of the PS 
  
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative Percent 
Valid excellent 12 2,4 2,4 2,4 
 good 100 20,0 20,0 22,4 
 ok 180 35,9 35,9 58,3 
 not good 67 13,4 13,4 71,7 
 bad 58 11,6 11,6 83,2 
 no reply 35 7,0 7,0 90,2 
 dont know 49 9,8 9,8 100,0 
 Total 501 100,0 100,0 
 
 
 
The overall number of respondents rating the performance of the PS generally 
positive (again assuming that „ok‟ is a positive rating) is almost identical to those 
responding positive in relation to their trust in the PS. Nevertheless, the assumption 
that there will be a slightly higher rate in terms of positive work assessment is not 
confirmed, for the number of interviewees generally trusting the institution of PS is 
marginally higher (0.3%) than the number of interviewees giving a positive rating 
of the performance of this institution. As regards the rating of the performance by 
the two PRI, again, like in relation to trust, a majority has a positive attitude 
towards these institutions. Also, again, this positive attitude decreases, the higher 
the institution level is. Interestingly, the numbers seem to decrease proportionally 
to the decrease in trust, indicating a strong connection between these two aspects. 
 
 
Perceived Improvements 
 
This part is concerned with the perception of various improvements in the fields of 
infrastructure and agriculture. The questions were fashioned in such a way that the 
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interviewee had the possibility to choose up to three objects of the field were he 
thinks improvements had been made under the PRS. 
For the measurement of improvement it is not only important how many 
interviewees choose an option or answered that they had not perceived any 
improvement, but also how many of the three options were used by the 
respondents. The first data which will be evaluated are about the infrastructural 
improvements as perceived by the respondents.  
 
 
Table 6: Improvements in Infrastructure 1 
Improvement of Infrastructure in the last 15 Years 
     
  
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative Percent 
Valid yes/better 
maintenance on 
streets 
249 49,7 49,7 49,7 
 yes/new/repaired 
drains 
17 3,4 3,4 53,1 
 yes/new/better 
equipped primary 
schools 
48 9,6 9,6 62,7 
 yes/new hospital 5 1,0 1,0 63,7 
 yes/new/better 
maintenance market 
5 1,0 1,0 64,7 
 yes/better access to 
the local 
administration 
1 0,2 0,2 64,9 
 yes/but cannot name 
it 
18 3,6 3,6 68,5 
 no 144 28,7 28,7 97,2 
 no reply 2 0,4 0,4 97,6 
 Don’t know 12 2,4 2,4 100,0 
 Total 501 100,0 100,0 
 
 
As regards the first option, nearly half of the respondents chose the improvement in 
street maintenance; whereas only approx. 19% (combined) saw any other 
improvement. This is at least a two-thirds majority who perceive improvements in 
infrastructure in regard to the first option, compared to nearly one third of 
respondents who saw no improvement at all. It is even more interesting when we 
look at the second and third option in this question. Considering the high support 
for PRI and the positive ratings of the performance of the PRI, one would expect 
that the perceived performance in relation to specific topics would be high too, but 
the numbers show otherwise. Only 377, out of 501 interviewees could respond to 
the question about a second improvement. Of those 377 respondents, more than 
one third answered that they did not perceive any second improvement. That leaves 
us with only 219 out of 501 interviewees who were able to name a second 
improvement, which is less than half of the sample (43.7%). Even worse are the 
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results for a third improvement. Only 267 could answer the question in regard to 
the third option and of those, only 108, or 21,5%, could name a third improvement. 
If we look at the results of the ratings of the GP, where almost 80% gave a positive 
assessment about the work done by the PRI, it is nearly incomprehensible why the 
respondents who had such a positive attitude towards the PRI in general did not 
perceive great improvements when it comes to a specific but vital topic like 
infrastructure. From a subjective point of view, I have to add that during the 
conduct of the survey I experienced the streets as badly maintained and the 
infrastructure in general as very underdeveloped, especially outside the urban 
areas. Since approx. 17% of the interviewees declared to be directly involved in 
agricultural activities, approx. 10% were farm owners, and  much more 
interviewees were probably involved in agricultural work as day-labourers but did 
not specify that, it is important to evaluate the perceived improvements made by 
the GPs concerning agriculture. 
 
 
Table 7: Improvements of Support in Agriculture  
Improvement of Support of Agriculture in the last 15 Years 
     
  
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative Percent 
Valid yes/new/improved 
irrigation 
101 20,2 20,3 20,3 
 yes/education in crop 
farming 
13 2,6 2,6 22,9 
 yes/education in the 
use of 
pesticides/herbicides 
8 1,6 1,6 24,5 
 yes/support/education 
in general questions 
2 0,4 0,4 24,9 
 yes/but cannot name it 14 2,8 2,8 27,8 
 no 224 44,7 45,1 72,8 
 no reply 4 0,8 0,8 73,6 
 dont know 131 26,1 26,4 100,0 
 Total 497 99,2 100,0  
Missing 99 4 0,8   
Total 501 100,0   
 
 
Just a little more than a quarter of the respondents were able to name an 
improvement in agricultural support by the GPs. Of those who could not name an 
improvement, 131 (approx. 25%) used the option “don‟t know”. We can assume 
that this is the number of respondents not directly involved in agricultural 
activities. This assumption is backed by the fact that this number remains stable in 
regard to all three options. A look at the numbers of the second and third option 
shows a similar trend as we have seen in relation to infrastructure, just worse. Only 
63 interviewees (14.9%) could name a second improvement and only 26 
respondents (6.7%) could name a third improvement. Even if we claim that the 
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above mentioned number of 17% of interviewees directly involved in agricultural 
activities is accurate and we exclude the high probility of a large number of 
respondents to be day labourers in agriculture, we can nevertheless assume that 
most of the interviewees, especially in the rural areas, must have had some form of 
direct contact to agriculture. Most of the families in the rural areas have at least 
small patches of land for self-sufficiency rice or vegetable farming. It is therefore 
very probable that most of the respondents in the rural areas must have had 
exposure to farming either through their own patch of agricultural land or through 
their families and/or  distant relatives. This assumption is supported by the above 
mentioned number of respondents who chose “don‟t know” as their answer. It is 
essential to keep in mind that support and education in relation to agricultural 
questions is an important aspect of PRI, more so in areas where large numbers of 
people are dependent on self-sufficiency farming, whether to improve their income 
or to survive. Especially education in the use of herbicides and pesticides is 
important, for those are often hazardous fluids and the use of it should be guided 
carefully by experts. Also eduction in the use of effective irrigation techniques 
could help improve harvests. . But only 21.2%
25
 believe that irrigation techniques 
have improved and only 12.8%
26
 responded that the education in the use of 
herbicides and pesticides has become better. Again, the question arises: Why have 
almost 80% of the respondents given a positive rating about the performance of the 
GPs but are not able to name any specific improvements in the area of agriculture? 
The most striking answer is probably: Because they really did not perceive any! 
The question whether there really were no improvements is of course another story. 
It is not determinable from the data whether the interviewees did not perceive 
improvements because there were, for example, no education courses for herbicide 
and pesticide use or because they were did not know about such courses. It is 
interesting to look at the numbers party-wise. Whereas in the CPI-M ruled GPs the 
percentage of respondents who perceived three improvements in infrastructure lies 
at 21.2%, the percentage of respondents perceiving three improvements in AITC 
controlled GPs lies at 22.3%. Except for respondents perceiving two improvements 
(here the difference is approx. 10% in favour of the AITC) the numbers are very 
similar. This is striking insofar as the trust rates and performance ratings carried 
out by the GPs are much better than in the CPI-M ruled GPs. 
 
Other core aspects of the PRS and therefore a crucial task for PRI, especially 
on the village level, are disease control, the treatment of ailments and the support 
of pregnant women through the provision of health-care facilities and services. The 
next data is based on the perception of improvements in the health-care sector since 
1993. Again the numbers show a low outcome in relation to improvements in the 
health-care sector. Just 41.6% saw any improvement in health-care during the 15 
years from 1993 to 2008. This low outcome is even more striking when taking into 
account the fact that only 18% of the respondents who needed medical attention 
during the previous six month answered that they had consulted a public medical 
doctor or nurse. Especially in rural areas where roads are often mere pathways and 
access to urban centres with hospitals depends on weather conditions, public 
health-care facilities and services are essential. The development of such facilities 
is a crucial task of the PRI and should not be regarded as a minor objective. The 
fact that not even half of the interviewees perceived any improvements in this area 
and a large majority obviously does not trust the public medical personnel and 
facilities is evidence of the neglect of this sector by the PRI or, at least, of 
inadequate information policies. 
                                                 
25 Combined number from options 1, 2 and 3 
26 Combined number from options 1, 2 and 3. 
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Information Policy 
 
As I have referred to information policies above it is necessary to evaluate the 
perceived provision of information by the PRI too. The provision of information is 
important insofar as it is needed by the citizens to form an enlightened decision. 
based on the information about the projects in progress or conducted by the 
institutions about which the elections are. The worse the information, the more 
citizens have to depend on perception, partisan propaganda and rumours. 
 
 
Table 9: Provision of Information by Local GP 
Provision of Information by the Gram Panchayat 
     
  
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative Percent 
Valid yes 217 43,3 43,3 43,3 
 no 255 50,9 50,9 94,2 
 no reply 8 1,6 1,6 95,8 
 dont know 21 4,2 4,2 100,0 
 Total 501 100,0 100,0 
 
 
 
The table shows that only 43.3% of the respondents, that is, less than half of the 
respondents, claim to be provided with information about the GPs work. But in 
order to make effective and informed decision, it is essential that the citizens are 
provided with sufficient information about projects and plans. Otherwise, they 
have to rely, at best, on media reports (which normally do not include the day-to-
day business of administrative institutions) or on rumours and propaganda, 
especially if they are unable to read and understand comprehensive newspapers. In 
such a situation the party cadres have it much easier to spread their propaganda and 
convince people that their party is the only feasible choice. Especially for the 
ruling party it is much easier to spread positive propaganda about the performance 
of their party representatives in the PRI when the voters are unable to judge the 
actual work for themselves. Then again, the information issued by the GPs can 
itself be used as an medium of propaganda. As we have seen before, the AITC has 
much higher trust rates and much better performance ratings, while at the same 
time, the provision of services, as, for example, the ratings in relation to 
infrastructure show, does not seem to be much better. But the information policy in 
AITC GPs seems to be much better: while only 38.2% of respondents in CPI-M 
ruled areas claimed to be provided with information by the GP, in villages ruled by 
the AITC the number lies at 64.1%. We might thus assume that the AITC has 
understood that normal propaganda is not sufficient enough, but that official 
information channels can be used for propaganda too. This allows for the active 
promotion of a few successful projects, producing a much better impression of the 
services provided by the local government than they really are.  Just how important 
this exercise of influence by a party is, will be shown in the next section.   
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The Perception of the Importance of Political Parties 
 
The following table shows the importance of the local party group of the CPI-M 
according to the respondents of the survey. The respondents were given various 
options to chose from, such as the local GP, the local Zamindar, the local CPI-M or 
other local party groups.   
 
Table 10: Importance in Local Politics 
More important in Local Politics 
     
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid your local gram 
panchayat 
97 19,4 19,4 19,4 
 the local group of the 
Communist Party 
229 45,7 45,7 65,1 
 other local party 
groups 
91 18,2 18,2 83,2 
 the local 
Zamindars/landlords 
3 0,6 0,6 83,8 
 no reply 16 3,2 3,2 87,0 
 Don’t know 65 13,0 13,0 100,0 
 Total 501 100,0 100,0 
 
 
 
Nearly half of all respondents (45.7%) regard the local CPI-M group as the most 
important institution in local politics, whereas just 19.4% think their local GP is the 
most important institution. Regardless of party affiliation or whether this prominent 
role is considered good or bad, the results show how influential the CPI-M is on 
the GP level and how indispensable it must appear to the citizens. The next table 
shows how important political parties are considered in general. The respondents 
were asked which they consider more important: local party groups or the local 
GP. 
 
Table 11: Importance of Political Parties Compared to Local GPs 
Political Parties more important than Gram Panchayat?      
  Frequenc
y 
Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative Percent 
Valid yes 329 65,7 65,7 65,7 
 no 64 12,8 12,8 78,4 
 no reply 14 2,8 2,8 81,2 
 Don’t 
know 
94 18,8 18,8 100,0 
 Total 501 100,0 100,0  
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Nearly two-thirds of the interviewees consider political parties as more important 
than the institution of the GP. This is a tough blow for the PRS, because this 
attitude enables party groups to build up and maintain parallel structures and even 
to shift decision making processes to the level of party committees. A look at the 
number of respondents who are members in a political party reveals just how few 
people are part of this parallel structure: only 23.4% of respondents were members  
of one of the many political parties.  
 
If we regard this through the lens of the  two-level hypothesis in Neo-
Institutionalism, we can assume that these party members are part of the elite 
which engineers an institutionalised environment in which the citizens are left 
without the ability for real choices and the impression of a lack of alternatives. 
Furthermore, it shows an impressive ability of the two leading parties, the CPI-M 
and the AITC, to mobilise their followers. On nearly every wall in Burdwan is a 
political slogan or at least a party sign. Party propaganda, especially by the CPI-M 
but also increasingly by the AITC, is omnipresent, even in more remote villages. 
The citizens are not able to get away from the influences of political parties., even 
if they probably do not perceive it on a conscious level anymore. This 
bombardment with propaganda and the omnipresence of parties in various forms, 
on signs on houses or walls, by announcements from cadres or rallies held nearby 
might account for fact that the respondents of this survey perceive political parties 
as more important than their local PRI. The PRI should influence the daily life of 
village citizens by constructing and maintaining infrastructure, promoting irrigation 
techniques in agriculture and keeping the citizens informed through public 
announcements, instead the villagers are living in an environment totally pervaded 
by party politics. Even if the personnel of the PRI were willing to be more visible 
in public and provide more information, they would still be unable to compete with 
the power of the parties in terms of presence in everyday life. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In order to conclude this short study, it is important to summarise and evaluate the 
findings of my survey again. At first glance the data show a high rate of trust in the 
GPs, although it is just general, not „cheerful‟ trust. A clear distinction between 
CPI-M-ruled GPs and AITC-ruled GPs is visible when regarding the data for the 
parties separately. While the respondents in the CPI-M ruled GPs are in 
“agreement without cheer” with their institutions, the respondents in AITC GPs 
“cheerfully agree” with their institutions. Similar results are visible in the ratings 
concerning the performance of the respective GPs. While nearly 60% of 
respondents in AITC areas perceived their GP as doing, at least, a good job, only 
about 20% in the CPI-M-ruled GPs had the same impression.  The same difference 
applies to the results on information policies. About 64% of interviewees in AITC 
areas claimed to be provided with information by their GP, whereas only about 
38% said that about their GP in CPI-M areas. 
 
So much for the differences, let us now consider the similarities: even though 
the AITC gained much better ratings and higher levels of trust, they seem to be as 
incapable as the CPI-M, to deliver services through PRI. Although improvements 
in agriculture and infrastructure are the two core tasks of the PRI as postulated in 
the West Bengal Panchayati Raj Act 1994, in all areas of the survey only a small 
minority could name three improvements. An average of only 21.5% of 
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respondents had perceived three different improvements in infrastructure during 
the 14 years from the ratification of the Panchayati Raj Act 1994 and the survey in 
2008, despite the large variety of tasks and responsibilities in the field of 
infrastructure which the GPs have. Additionally, just 6.7% of the interviewees 
perceived three improvements in agriculture, even though this is one of the core 
responsibilities of the GPs and in spite of the fact that improvements in agriculture 
could be accomplished with little financial and personal effort. Also the health-care 
system, another one of the main tasks of the PRI,  is also not delivering effective 
services in the eyes of the respondents. About 41% acknowledged that there had 
been improvements in health-care since the effect of the Panchayati Raj Act. Still, 
only 18% of those who were in medical treatment consulted public medical 
personnel. This is clearly a hint that public-health care is not trusted, possibly 
because it is in a deplorable condition.  
 
So what can be deduced from the data? Clearly a large gap exists between the 
general agreement on the usefulness of the institutions and the perception of the 
actual performance of the same institutions. The question remains why about 75% 
generally trust the institutions and nearly 80% think that the work done by the GPs 
is, at least, ok, when in fact they cannot think of much improvements during the 
one and a half decade of the PRS. Why is there such a difference in the perception 
of the institutions as such and the performance of the very same institutions?  
 
An answer can be found when taking into account that the PRS election 
system is based on party democracy. That is, normally the persons elected into an 
office of a PRI are representatives of political parties. As can be gathered from the 
survey, citizens consider parties of greater importance than the PRI, but with party 
representatives in office the institutions become closely connected to the 
representatives and the representatives with the party in power. While the 
institutions as such might be closely aligned with the party in power in the 
perception of citizens, the same citizens fail to establish a direct connection 
between the performance of these institutions and the party in power.  General trust 
is invested in the institution because it is represented by a certain party. The same 
is valid for the general rating of its performance. One reason for this can be found 
in the massive political propaganda by the parties, which generates the impression 
that the party in power is the only viable choice,  even if citizens disapprove of the 
party or its performance. This is known as the “logic of appropriateness” 
(March/Olsen 2009), which produces the perception that in a highly 
institutionalised environment only one choice could be acceptable. In the case of 
the CPI-M this logic has brought forth the aforementioned “agreement without 
cheer”. In case of the AITC with its “cheering agreement” it should be taken into 
account that during the survey the Singur agitation of the AITC leader Mamata 
Banerjee against land acquisitions was at its peak and the media covered it almost 
24/7. This might have contributed to the increase in trust and its performance 
ratings. The good ratings of the AITC GPs  might thus be due to the success of 
their agitation campaign and the media attention it received. Taking into account 
all of the above, I would argue that the glory days of Operation Barga are over and 
that West Bengal has lost its model status. The objectives of the CPI-M-led Left-
Front have changed in the last three decades. The CPI-M now tries to impose large 
scale industrialisation and has succumbed to capitalism as can be seen, for 
example, in that it has established Special Economic Zones and built large 
industrial complexes, all under the direction of the central state government. This 
not just interferes with and ultimately renders impossible local democratisation and 
development.. The survey data shows that there is “agreement without cheer” by 
the citizens for the lower PRI, especially in CPI-M ruled GPs, but at the same time 
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it also clearly indicates that the citizens do not see much improvement, which very 
likely points to the fact that there has not been much improvement in actual terms. 
The main achievement of the CPI-M in the past three decades has been to cement 
its position in  the social and cultural environment of West Bengal, thus making 
itself appear indispensable. When comparing this to Chatterjee‟s findings, the 2008 
survey and his 2006 survey arrive at nearly the same conclusion: The institutions of 
the PRS as such are not questioned. Chatterjee mentioned that a large number of 
interviewees in the 2006 survey regard the PRI as a fact and accept it. However, he 
also came to the conclusion that a majority of the respondents does not believe that 
the institutions carry out good services. Similar to the results of my 2008 survey, 
support for the institutions and their effectiveness do not correlate. Unfortunately, 
Chatterjee gave no accurate numbers in his article, nor did he print the 
questionnaire or outline the exact method of his survey.  
 
No data points towards the conclusion that the West Bengal PRS can be 
further be referred to as a model. It is also highly unlikely that a rise to power of 
the AITC could change this and reassert its model status. The AITC is currently 
using the same mechanisms as the CPI-M. Additionally, the AITC is too focused 
on the anti-land-acquisition agitation and the person of Mamata Banerjee. The best 
possible scenario would be a stabilisation of both parties on equal voting shares on 
all levels as this might force them to learn that effective policies and democratic 
governance is the most effective propaganda for elections.  
 
Concerning the two theoretical approaches, Rational Choice Institutionalism 
and Sociological Institutionalism, it is clear that none of the two approaches can be 
regarded as offering a satisfactory explanation of the results of the survey. The 
Rational Choice model can explain the action of the party elite, but fails to answer 
the question why the citizens still support a system which does not deliver, 
although this is not a rational decision.. The Sociological model, on the other hand, 
is able to answer the question of the irrational support of the PRI. But as far as the 
behaviour of the political elites is concerned it is much less fitting than the Rational 
Choice model, which exactly describes the ability of those party actors to act in the 
above mentioned way. 
 
This study thus calls for a realistic model which combines both approaches. In 
this model the elite actors, which decide rationally utilise the inability of the 
sociological actors to perceive alternatives to the elite actors, and the elite actors 
consciously reinforce this perception, for example, through propaganda.  
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